In response to repeated cyber espionage campaigns by foreign governments, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) launched the “Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program”—colloquially known as the “rip and replace” mandate—to rid US telecom networks of devices, cables, and equipment linked to foreign adversaries.
Legislators in multiple states have introduced complementary bills targeting foreign adversary equipment in telecom networks, but Wisconsin’s approach stands out for the scope of its problems. State Senator Patrick Testin, who cosponsored the bill, argues that foreign adversaries have “turned to states” and local governments as a “soft underbelly” for infiltration. While Senator Testin is right about the threat, AB 683‘s overbroad definitions, duplicative compliance burdens, and counterproductive disclosure requirements would do more harm than good. With the federal program now fully funded and a May 2026 removal deadline approaching, Wisconsin lawmakers should set this bill aside and let the federal program do its job.
The rip-and-replace program targets specific companies on the FCC’s Covered List—Huawei, ZTE, Hytera—and bars their equipment from being installed in U.S. networks. The Wisconsin bill takes a different approach, instead defining what constitutes a “foreign principal” so broadly that it could theoretically cover the plastic wrapping on a wireless router. Under the bill, a “foreign principal” includes any business organized under a foreign adversary’s laws, any entity with 50 percent or more foreign adversary ownership, and even individual citizens of those countries. Telecom providers would be forced to trace supply chains, verify ownership structures, and monitor ongoing changes far beyond what federal law requires.
The bill’s definition of “critical telecommunications infrastructure” is equally expansive, covering any physical equipment that supports the transmission of information “regardless of the transmission medium or technology employed.” Combined with the broad “foreign principal” definition, compliance obligations could potentially reach component manufacturers, subcontractors, and allied-country firms with incidental foreign investment ties.
Modern telecom supply chains are global by necessity. Components routinely pass through multiple countries before final assembly, making the comprehensive origin tracing the bill demands practically impossible. The bill’s 50 percent ownership threshold could even capture equipment from European or Japanese manufacturers with minority Chinese investment stakes, banning products that pose no actual security risk. Federal regulators intentionally avoided this problem by targeting specific companies rather than entire supply chains.
Even if the definitional concerns were remedied, the legislation simply duplicates federal requirements. Carriers already must remove covered equipment by May 2026, and the federal program provides nearly $5 billion in reimbursements to make it happen. Wisconsin’s bill layers on annual certification requirements to the Public Service Commission, forcing carriers to prove compliance to the state even if they’ve already satisfied federal mandates. Unlike the federal program, which offers financial assistance, this legislation just mandates paperwork. The legislature’s own fiscal estimate confirms as much, projecting $122,200 in new annual costs just to process the certifications and produce maps the bill requires. A smarter approach would recognize federal compliance as sufficient, rather than treating carriers as non-compliant by default.
Perhaps most troubling, a bill designed to secure Wisconsin’s telecom networks could end up making them less secure. The legislation forces carriers to report the geographic coordinates of any covered equipment, map the coverage areas those systems serve, and submit detailed replacement plans to the Public Service Commission. The PSC would then compile this information into a publicly available map and deliver annual reports to the governor and legislature. In practice, this hands foreign adversaries exactly the targeting information they’re already trying to obtain. Foreign hackers spend years mapping U.S. telecom infrastructure to initiate attacks; Wisconsin would help them map it for free.
These burdens would fall hardest on Wisconsin’s smaller and rural carriers operating on thin margins. The federal rip-and-replace program nearly collapsed rural providers nationwide before Congress fully funded it. Adding unfunded state mandates could delay broadband expansion in the communities that need it most.
Wisconsin isn’t the only state exploring this option either. Other states, including Nebraska and Arizona, are looking to build legislation similar to AB 683.
Wisconsin legislators are right to take telecom security seriously. But AB 683 would burden carriers with unfunded mandates, create compliance costs that exceed federal requirements, and publicly disclose the very infrastructure information adversaries seek. The federal program already addresses that threat and helps pay for needed replacements. Wisconsin should let this bill go.
